- J. Michael Waller is a scholar-practitioner who specializes in strategic influence, strategic communication, internat... moreJ. Michael Waller is a scholar-practitioner who specializes in strategic influence, strategic communication, international political organization and communication, political and psychological warfare, and related fields. He holds a PhD in international security affairs from Boston University (1993).
From 2000 to 2013, Dr Waller held the Walter and Leonore Annenberg Chair in International Communications as a professor at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC.
Dr Waller is President of Georgetown Research, a private research and analytical company in Washington, DC.
He is a founding editorial board member of two peer-reviewed scholarly journals: Defence Strategic Communications, published by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, and Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization (George Washington University).
Dr Waller does not hold an "emeritus" title from Boston University. The Academia.edu software inserted that title automatically and does not have a function to correct.edit
In a bid to pressure the Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Clinton administration withheld evidence of Russia's continued development and production of chemical weapons. That decision in the 1990s haunts us today as... more
In a bid to pressure the Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Clinton administration withheld evidence of Russia's continued development and production of chemical weapons. That decision in the 1990s haunts us today as one of those banned weapons, Novichok, is used to attack and assassinate critics of Vladimir Putin.
Research Interests:
Russian translation of "Nursing Injustices: An unsparing psychological profile of Vladimir Putin will reveal a deeply vulnerable Kremlin leader" (Washington: Center for Security Policy, 2021). Все свои двадцать один год у власти... more
Russian translation of "Nursing Injustices: An unsparing psychological profile of Vladimir Putin will reveal a deeply vulnerable Kremlin leader" (Washington: Center for Security Policy, 2021).
Все свои двадцать один год у власти Владимир Путин представляет себя обществу в образе спасителя России. Руководители этой страны всегда были загадкой для сторонних наблюдателей, но Путин загадочен вдвойне. Даже сегодня, после столь продолжительного нахождения у власти все, что касается мотивов и целей его деятельности, представляется труднообъяснимым. Многие западные критики воспринимают его как практически неуязвимого лидера. В то же время некоторые проницательные наблюдатели полагают, что он скрывает свою чрезвычайную уязвимость, которую можно эксплуатировать.
Все свои двадцать один год у власти Владимир Путин представляет себя обществу в образе спасителя России. Руководители этой страны всегда были загадкой для сторонних наблюдателей, но Путин загадочен вдвойне. Даже сегодня, после столь продолжительного нахождения у власти все, что касается мотивов и целей его деятельности, представляется труднообъяснимым. Многие западные критики воспринимают его как практически неуязвимого лидера. В то же время некоторые проницательные наблюдатели полагают, что он скрывает свою чрезвычайную уязвимость, которую можно эксплуатировать.
Research Interests:
Psychological profiling of foreign leaders has been an important tool of intelligence since the British and American profiles of Hitler to exploit his personal vulnerabilities during World War II. Russian leader Vladimir Putin nurses... more
Psychological profiling of foreign leaders has been an important tool of intelligence since the British and American profiles of Hitler to exploit his personal vulnerabilities during World War II. Russian leader Vladimir Putin nurses profound personal vulnerabilities ripe for exploitation.
Effective exploitation of Putin’s weak points requires a certain degree of political incorrectness that few Kremlin-watchers or geostrategists seem willing to risk. That reluctance has squandered endless opportunities to hem in the Russian dictator without risking harm to the Russian people, or armed conflict beyond Russia’s borders.
Effective exploitation of Putin’s weak points requires a certain degree of political incorrectness that few Kremlin-watchers or geostrategists seem willing to risk. That reluctance has squandered endless opportunities to hem in the Russian dictator without risking harm to the Russian people, or armed conflict beyond Russia’s borders.
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Antifa's international networks, first noted by the Obama administration, remain largely unknown. The broad militant movement sweeping the United States in 2020 borrows heavily from foreign organizations, networks, governments, and at... more
Antifa's international networks, first noted by the Obama administration, remain largely unknown. The broad militant movement sweeping the United States in 2020 borrows heavily from foreign organizations, networks, governments, and at times, foreign intelligence services. Some of its key organizers and intellectual authors are either foreign nationals or American citizens trained abroad as professional revolutionaries and agitators.
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Ridicule is an ancient weapon of political and military conflict that, properly applied, can be a decisive nonlethal tool of smart power and hard power statecraft. The US Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,... more
Ridicule is an ancient weapon of political and military conflict that, properly applied, can be a decisive nonlethal tool of smart power and hard power statecraft. The US Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, commissioned this article for its bimonthly intellectual journal, Military Review, published in the September-October 2017 edition.
Research Interests: Information Warfare, Strategic Communication, Information operations (IO), Soft Power, Political Warfare, and 7 moreSoft Power and International Relations, Smart Power, Psychological warfare, Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, Soft Power and Public Diplomacy, Ridicule, and Psychology of Ridicule
Final draft: Elements of the American professional foreign service show a worldview of solidarity with international social justice NGOs, at the expense of promoting the US national interest. As such, American embassies are targets of... more
Final draft: Elements of the American professional foreign service show a worldview of solidarity with international social justice NGOs, at the expense of promoting the US national interest. As such, American embassies are targets of international pressure campaigns to leverage their intervention in the political and judicial systems of host countries. The secretary of state's attempts to reorganize and reform the State Department, and with it, the professional foreign service, will benefit from a case study of the problem, in this case, the US-Canadian-owned Escobal silver mine in Guatemala.
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Subversion is an ambiguous form of conflict in war and peace that does not rely on violence. From the perspective of the target, subversion is so ambiguous – and often gradual and long-term – that American diplomatic, security, and... more
Subversion is an ambiguous form of conflict in war and peace that does not rely on violence. From the perspective of the target, subversion is so ambiguous – and often gradual and long-term – that American diplomatic, security, and military planners find it difficult to identify, recognize, understand, and neutralize. Subversion has a logic and process of its own that permits identification for defense and offensive purposes to Phase 0. This paper summarizes a larger concept paper to explore subversion for defensive and offensive purposes.
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Russia’s new information war is a logical outgrowth of the way Vladimir Putin engineered his rise to power. As the security minister and designated successor to the ailing and alcoholic President Boris Yeltsin in 1999, Putin engineered... more
Russia’s new information war is a logical outgrowth of the way Vladimir Putin engineered his rise to power. As the security minister and designated successor to the ailing and alcoholic President Boris Yeltsin in 1999, Putin engineered the bombings of apartment buildings in southern Russia and blamed the slaughter on Chechen rebels. His “propaganda by deed” provided the pretext to launch a new war to smash the Chechen rebellion. Both created the mass outrage that called for strong and decisive leadership, manufacturing and focusing public demand his quiet ouster of Yeltsin on the night of Y2K.
Seen through that lens, the Kremlin’s weaponization of information is a logical, proven, cost-effective means of domestic political action, internal security, and international power projection. It succeeds because neither the Russian public nor the West demanded a public accounting of Russia’s Communist past the role of the former KGB as the sword and shield of the Soviet state. Both were willing to suspend their belief for their own purposes.
Inaction from three successive American presidents empowered Putin and unwittingly gave the otherwise weak Russia an enormous capability to wage war, sometimes without firing a shot. Information, properly applied, gives leverage to the materially weaker side. The Kremlin’s new information warfare and propaganda capabilities, while innovative for a government, merit concern mostly because of the West’s flaccid and delayed response.
The capabilities and actions present a strategic challenge. With the grave but unsurprising exception of subversion of the U.S. political system, they hardly merit the breathless reportage and commentary from many political observers, because they have been building up visibly for more than a decade.
Putin’s unnecessarily aggressive info-centric actions give the U.S. and its partners the pretext to exploit the potentially profound vulnerabilities of the secret-police regime, and the fragilities that, if exploited, could widen many existing splits within the Putin leadership itself and the Russian Federation at large.
All this, of course, lowers the threshold of conflict to the level of classical espionage, propaganda, and subversion, at which the Kremlin has excelled for the past century, with a modern digital twist. The U.S. and its allies generally have opted not to engage, out of the quaint “gentlemen don’t read other people’s mail” principle, or more likely, simple ignorance about what to do or how. After a long period of not wanting to see, the West finds itself surprised and alarmed at being on the receiving end of what historically is a simple and manageable method of statecraft.
Seen through that lens, the Kremlin’s weaponization of information is a logical, proven, cost-effective means of domestic political action, internal security, and international power projection. It succeeds because neither the Russian public nor the West demanded a public accounting of Russia’s Communist past the role of the former KGB as the sword and shield of the Soviet state. Both were willing to suspend their belief for their own purposes.
Inaction from three successive American presidents empowered Putin and unwittingly gave the otherwise weak Russia an enormous capability to wage war, sometimes without firing a shot. Information, properly applied, gives leverage to the materially weaker side. The Kremlin’s new information warfare and propaganda capabilities, while innovative for a government, merit concern mostly because of the West’s flaccid and delayed response.
The capabilities and actions present a strategic challenge. With the grave but unsurprising exception of subversion of the U.S. political system, they hardly merit the breathless reportage and commentary from many political observers, because they have been building up visibly for more than a decade.
Putin’s unnecessarily aggressive info-centric actions give the U.S. and its partners the pretext to exploit the potentially profound vulnerabilities of the secret-police regime, and the fragilities that, if exploited, could widen many existing splits within the Putin leadership itself and the Russian Federation at large.
All this, of course, lowers the threshold of conflict to the level of classical espionage, propaganda, and subversion, at which the Kremlin has excelled for the past century, with a modern digital twist. The U.S. and its allies generally have opted not to engage, out of the quaint “gentlemen don’t read other people’s mail” principle, or more likely, simple ignorance about what to do or how. After a long period of not wanting to see, the West finds itself surprised and alarmed at being on the receiving end of what historically is a simple and manageable method of statecraft.
Research Interests: Russian Studies, Journalism, Information Warfare, Strategic Communication, Psychological operations (PSYOP), and 7 moreInformation operations (IO), Soft Power, Russia, Soft Power and International Relations, Psychological warfare, Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, and Soft Power and Public Diplomacy
The purpose of information warfare is to use information as a weapon of war. The premise of this presentation is that in warfare and political conflict, to inform is to influence. Therefore, the purpose of information warfare is to... more
The purpose of information warfare is to use information as a weapon of war. The premise of this presentation is that in warfare and political conflict, to inform is to influence. Therefore, the purpose of information warfare is to influence thought processes, beliefs, emotions, and ultimately behavior. We integrate information warfare with psychological operations and raise both to the strategic level for military and other national planning purposes.
Published by Threat Knowledge Group for the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, US Army Special Operations Command, 2014.
Reprinted in Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., ed., Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Vol. 143, The Evolution of the Islamic State (Oxford University Press, 2016).
Published by Threat Knowledge Group for the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, US Army Special Operations Command, 2014.
Reprinted in Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., ed., Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Vol. 143, The Evolution of the Islamic State (Oxford University Press, 2016).
Research Interests:
The Muslim Brotherhood's general doctrine, strategy, and objectives show vulnerabilities that civilized societies can exploit for the Ikhwan's ultimate defeat. The Muslim Brotherhood is an Egypt-based, global political movement founded... more
The Muslim Brotherhood's general doctrine, strategy, and objectives show vulnerabilities that civilized societies can exploit for the Ikhwan's ultimate defeat.
The Muslim Brotherhood is an Egypt-based, global political movement founded in 1928, and rooted in the idea that it should be the political vanguard of Islamic transformation of an individual's ordinary life and of political society. Its strategic objective is to impose a caliphate worldwide. The end state of the Muslim Brotherhood is the overthrow or subjugation of all governments around the world under a totalitarian form of Islamism.
This paper, written in 2012 for the US government's Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTSO) in 2013, was published as a chapter in Anna Bekele and Patrick Sookhdeo, eds., Meeting the Ideological Challenge of Islamism: How to Combat Modern Radical Islam (Westminster Institute, 2014).
The Muslim Brotherhood is an Egypt-based, global political movement founded in 1928, and rooted in the idea that it should be the political vanguard of Islamic transformation of an individual's ordinary life and of political society. Its strategic objective is to impose a caliphate worldwide. The end state of the Muslim Brotherhood is the overthrow or subjugation of all governments around the world under a totalitarian form of Islamism.
This paper, written in 2012 for the US government's Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTSO) in 2013, was published as a chapter in Anna Bekele and Patrick Sookhdeo, eds., Meeting the Ideological Challenge of Islamism: How to Combat Modern Radical Islam (Westminster Institute, 2014).
Research Interests: Propaganda, Information Warfare, Psychological operations (PSYOP), Islamism, Muslim Brotherhood, and 5 morePsychological warfare, Islamist movements, Jihadism and Radical Islamism, Radical Islamist Movements, and Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR), or the basic aspects of modern psychological operations (PSYOP), have been known by many other names or terms, including Psy Ops, Political Warfare, “Hearts and Minds”, and Propaganda
The civilized world can learn lessons for eradicating radical Islamic extremism by studying American psychological strategy against Soviet expansionism in Europe following World War II. This paper reviews the non-kinetic warfare waged... more
The civilized world can learn lessons for eradicating radical Islamic extremism by studying American psychological strategy against Soviet expansionism in Europe following World War II.
This paper reviews the non-kinetic warfare waged between the democratic West and the Soviets after 1945, and shows how a combination of relentless ideological warfare and the threat of total thermonuclear destruction ultimately brought down the USSR and the ideological belief system of Soviet Communism. It also shows the need for a revival of psychological strategy to defeat radical Islamic extremism and its sponsors.
This paper was commissioned by the Threat Knowledge Group for the Department of Defense Irregular Warfare Support Program in 2012.
This paper reviews the non-kinetic warfare waged between the democratic West and the Soviets after 1945, and shows how a combination of relentless ideological warfare and the threat of total thermonuclear destruction ultimately brought down the USSR and the ideological belief system of Soviet Communism. It also shows the need for a revival of psychological strategy to defeat radical Islamic extremism and its sponsors.
This paper was commissioned by the Threat Knowledge Group for the Department of Defense Irregular Warfare Support Program in 2012.
Research Interests: Information Warfare, Strategic Communication, Psychological operations (PSYOP), Information operations (IO), Islamism, and 6 moreJihadism, Defence and Strategic Studies, Psychological warfare, Defense and Strategic Studies, Jihadism and Radical Islamism, and Explore the key success factor of international strategic alliances
A decade after the bipartisan success to destroy the nation's public diplomacy machinery, the nation has still not regained its capability to wage strategic influence worldwide. This article, published in the Journal of International... more
A decade after the bipartisan success to destroy the nation's public diplomacy machinery, the nation has still not regained its capability to wage strategic influence worldwide. This article, published in the Journal of International Security Affairs, asks why the capability was not restored after 9/11, and argues that strategic communication is strategic influence.
Research Interests: Propaganda, Public Diplomacy, Psychological operations (PSYOP), Intercultural Communication and Public Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, and Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR), or the basic aspects of modern psychological operations (PSYOP), have been known by many other names or terms, including Psy Ops, Political Warfare, “Hearts and Minds”, and Propaganda
Some of the nation's leading thinkers and practitioners combine talents in this edited volume to discuss elements of strategic influence as weapons of warfare. They include: J Michael Waller, the editor of this volume; Angelo Codevilla,... more
Some of the nation's leading thinkers and practitioners combine talents in this edited volume to discuss elements of strategic influence as weapons of warfare. They include: J Michael Waller, the editor of this volume; Angelo Codevilla, Andrew Garfield, Carnes Lord, Juliana Geran Pilon, Robert Reilly, the late Herbert Romerstein, David Spencer and James Tierney, and emerging figures including Stephen Baker, Jennifer Marshall and Hampton Stephens.
Research Interests: Propaganda, Public Diplomacy, Diplomacy, Psychological operations (PSYOP), Cultural Diplomacy, and 8 moreIntercultural Communication and Public Diplomacy, Political Warfare, Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, Communication And Public Diplomacy, Diplomacy and international relations, Soft Power and Public Diplomacy, International Relations/cooperation, and Global and Political Communication
Branding – the art of conditioning an audience to associate a given product, person or idea with a desired cognitive or emotional response – can be an important part of developing messages. The U.S. attempted to “brand” itself after 9/11,... more
Branding – the art of conditioning an audience to associate a given product, person or idea with a desired cognitive or emotional response – can be an important part of developing messages. The U.S. attempted to “brand” itself after 9/11, but after some innovative attempts with negligible results, quietly abandoned the effort. The idea, however, is sound. In the commercial marketplace of ideas, branding is a proven path to success, and the failure to brand can put one out of business. It is time to try branding again, but this time the U.S. should start with a message that its audiences are most likely to accept readily: the evil nature of the enemy. Reinforcement of that negative “brand” sets the stage for greater audience receptivity to positive follow-on messages about the United States itself.
This paper was republished as a section of Waller's monograph, Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War.
This paper was republished as a section of Waller's monograph, Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War.
Research Interests:
The American Founding Fathers practiced propaganda, psychological warfare, and other forms of psychological manipulation that US policymakers tend to reject today during a state of unconventional war. This paper examines the role of... more
The American Founding Fathers practiced propaganda, psychological warfare, and other forms of psychological manipulation that US policymakers tend to reject today during a state of unconventional war. This paper examines the role of propaganda in the American founding.
Research Interests: American History, Propaganda, Public Diplomacy, Strategic Communication, Psychological operations (PSYOP), and 8 moreInformation operations (IO), History Of Propaganda, Soft Power, Soft Power and International Relations, Psychological warfare, Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, War Propaganda, and Soft Power and Public Diplomacy
The Mexican Constitution restricts the rights of foreign residents, foreign workers, and naturalized citizens, to that they have no hope of enjoying the rights of native-born Mexicans. This short paper discusses the sections of the... more
The Mexican Constitution restricts the rights of foreign residents, foreign workers, and naturalized citizens, to that they have no hope of enjoying the rights of native-born Mexicans. This short paper discusses the sections of the Mexican Constitution concerning the rights of immigrants.
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The revolutionary Hugo Chavez regime in Venezuela presents a threat to the stability and viability of the oil-rich country, and to hemispheric security. This 2005 Occasional Paper examines the problems, potential problems, and prospective... more
The revolutionary Hugo Chavez regime in Venezuela presents a threat to the stability and viability of the oil-rich country, and to hemispheric security. This 2005 Occasional Paper examines the problems, potential problems, and prospective solutions to Venezuela's bolivarist regime.
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The state security apparatus of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was based on a chekist model, inspired by the Soviet political police and intelligence system, under Cuban implementation. As of 2004, the apparatus's survival in a... more
The state security apparatus of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was based on a chekist model, inspired by the Soviet political police and intelligence system, under Cuban implementation. As of 2004, the apparatus's survival in a democratic society encourages a culture of impunity and corruption that will undermine Nicaraguan society and invite new forms of dictatorship.
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The former KGB's takeover of Russia's political and economic institutions was easy to foresee when the post-Soviet government decided to preserve and rehabilitate—not repudiate—the entire legacy of the Bolshevik secret police. There was... more
The former KGB's takeover of Russia's political and economic institutions was easy to foresee when the post-Soviet government decided to preserve and rehabilitate—not repudiate—the entire legacy of the Bolshevik secret police. There was little serious attempt and no strategy to expose excesses and crimes or to prevent such a system from emerging again, whether from within the Russian leadership or from outside pressure.
The KGB survived as a continuum with the Soviet past. By the 2000 presidential election, being an unrepentant career KGB officer had become a political asset instead of a liability. At the time of this writing in 2004, the former KGB is fully institutionalized throughout the Russian government, different from before in style and structure, but in greater control of the instruments of state power than even the Soviets allowed. For an appreciation of the nature of the security apparatus in today’s Russia, one first must review what the Cheka was, what it did, what it stood for, and what it begat.
The KGB survived as a continuum with the Soviet past. By the 2000 presidential election, being an unrepentant career KGB officer had become a political asset instead of a liability. At the time of this writing in 2004, the former KGB is fully institutionalized throughout the Russian government, different from before in style and structure, but in greater control of the instruments of state power than even the Soviets allowed. For an appreciation of the nature of the security apparatus in today’s Russia, one first must review what the Cheka was, what it did, what it stood for, and what it begat.
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It wasn't the army that saved Boris Yeltsin in the 1993 parliamentary rebellion against his rule. It was the organs of the old KGB. This relationship will define the rest of Yeltsin's presidency.
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A 25-year retrospective following the September 11, 2001 attacks, on Stefan Possony's underestimated "International Terrorism: The Soviet Connection." This paper finds that Possony's 1977 work was prescient and accurate. The paper then... more
A 25-year retrospective following the September 11, 2001 attacks, on Stefan Possony's underestimated "International Terrorism: The Soviet Connection." This paper finds that Possony's 1977 work was prescient and accurate. The paper then surveys the Soviet and Communist roots of certain aspects of modern Arab and jihadist terrorism and Islamist extremism. The author was new to the study of jihadist terrorism and organization, and identified modern Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood extremism as "Wahhabi," by virtue of the support bases for such movements.
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Why is so little known about the KGB career of Russia's acting President Vladimir Putin? Most reporting on both sides of the Atlantic is thinly sourced, if sourced at all, and often conflicting. Was Putin a professional foreign... more
Why is so little known about the KGB career of Russia's acting President Vladimir Putin? Most reporting on both sides of the Atlantic is thinly sourced, if sourced at all, and often conflicting. Was Putin a professional foreign intelligence cadre officer whose experience abroad exposed him to reformist ideas, as many claim? If so, how was he, the first Russian leader since Andropov to have lived abroad, and the leader who lived abroad the longest since Lenin, exposed to enlightened thinking from his isolated outpost in Erich Honecker's East Germany? If Putin wasn't a cadre intelligence officer, what was he? Determining with which part of the KGB Putin identifies himself will help determine what shaped his professional formation and experience and could serve as a guidepost toward the direction in which he will lead Russia. The KGB was no monolith. Its sprawling bureaucracy and diverse functions employed polished spies steeped in Western ways, scholars, linguists, mathematicians, engineers, paper-pushing bureaucrats, guardsmen, and the ubiquitous thugs, snoops and dissident-hunters that formed the core of the KGB ethos.
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A chapter published in Lawrence J. McQuillan and Peter C. Montgomery's collected work, The International Monetary Fund: Financial Medic to the World? A Primer on Mission, Operations, and Public Policy Issues, published by the Hoover... more
A chapter published in Lawrence J. McQuillan and Peter C. Montgomery's collected work, The International Monetary Fund: Financial Medic to the World? A Primer on Mission, Operations, and Public Policy Issues, published by the Hoover Institution Press.
This short chapter questions the connection between IMF cash loans to the Russian Central Bank while the Russian government modernized its strategic nuclear weapons force in the 1990s.
"Among the contributors are Doug Bandow, Robert Barro, Sebastian Edwards, Stanley Fischer, Milton Friedman, James Glassman, Jim Hoagland, Jack Kemp, Paul Krugman, Lawrence Lindsey, George Melloan, Peter Passell, David Rockefeller, Jeffrey Sachs, Robert Samuelson, Bernard Sanders, David Sanger, Anna Schwartz, Judy Shelton, George Shultz, William Simon, Robert Solomon, Lawrence Summers, Walter Wriston, and Leland Yeager." (Hoover Institution Press)
This short chapter questions the connection between IMF cash loans to the Russian Central Bank while the Russian government modernized its strategic nuclear weapons force in the 1990s.
"Among the contributors are Doug Bandow, Robert Barro, Sebastian Edwards, Stanley Fischer, Milton Friedman, James Glassman, Jim Hoagland, Jack Kemp, Paul Krugman, Lawrence Lindsey, George Melloan, Peter Passell, David Rockefeller, Jeffrey Sachs, Robert Samuelson, Bernard Sanders, David Sanger, Anna Schwartz, Judy Shelton, George Shultz, William Simon, Robert Solomon, Lawrence Summers, Walter Wriston, and Leland Yeager." (Hoover Institution Press)
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The US international assistance bureaucracy, as well as many policymakers, resist criticism of aid to post-Soviet Russia. This case study is based on State Department and Defense Department response to an article that J Michael Waller... more
The US international assistance bureaucracy, as well as many policymakers, resist criticism of aid to post-Soviet Russia. This case study is based on State Department and Defense Department response to an article that J Michael Waller wrote in Reader's Digest magazine about how US aid to Russia was not accomplishing the intended objectives. The series includes Waller's responses to the departments of state and defense.
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The author of the critique of US aid to Russia issues a rebuttal to the State Department's defense against his argument.
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The author critiqued the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR or Nunn-Lugar) aid to dismantle Soviet weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, and the Department of Defense responded. This article is the author's rebuttal to Ashton... more
The author critiqued the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR or Nunn-Lugar) aid to dismantle Soviet weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, and the Department of Defense responded. This article is the author's rebuttal to Ashton Carter's Pentagon response.
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Part of a 4-part series of translated transcripts of the suppressed parliamentary hearings on the circumstances of the 1991 coup in the Soviet Union, this section contains part of the proceedings of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet... more
Part of a 4-part series of translated transcripts of the suppressed parliamentary hearings on the circumstances of the 1991 coup in the Soviet Union, this section contains part of the proceedings of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet hearings on the Participation and Leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Dr Waller edited the English translation of the transcript.
Dr Waller edited the English translation of the transcript.
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The third of a 4-part series of translated transcripts of the suppressed USSR Supreme Soviet hearings "Concerning the Role of the Repressive Organs in the Putsch of 19-21 August 1991," with editor's introduction. Dr Waller edited the... more
The third of a 4-part series of translated transcripts of the suppressed USSR Supreme Soviet hearings "Concerning the Role of the Repressive Organs in the Putsch of 19-21 August 1991," with editor's introduction.
Dr Waller edited the English translation.
Dr Waller edited the English translation.
Research Interests:
The second of a 4-part series of translated transcripts of the suppressed USSR Supreme Soviet hearings "Concerning the Role of the Repressive Organs in the Putsch of 19-21 August 1991," with editor's introduction. Dr Waller edited the... more
The second of a 4-part series of translated transcripts of the suppressed USSR Supreme Soviet hearings "Concerning the Role of the Repressive Organs in the Putsch of 19-21 August 1991," with editor's introduction. Dr Waller edited the English translation.
Research Interests:
The first publication in English of the suppressed USSR Supreme Soviet transcripts of hearings "Concerning the Role of Repressive Organs in the Putsch of 19-21 August 1991." With editor's introduction and comments. First of 4 parts. Dr... more
The first publication in English of the suppressed USSR Supreme Soviet transcripts of hearings "Concerning the Role of Repressive Organs in the Putsch of 19-21 August 1991." With editor's introduction and comments. First of 4 parts. Dr Waller edited the English translations.
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Written days after the Soviet putsch against Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991, this article shows how, "In trying to construct a "law-governed state" that would preserve the supremacy of the center, Gorbachev laid down the legal framework... more
Written days after the Soviet putsch against Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991, this article shows how, "In trying to construct a "law-governed state" that would preserve the supremacy of the center, Gorbachev laid down the legal framework for his own overthrow. His decrees flouting the democratic process and his refusal to promote parliamentary oversight of the internal security organs and the military permitted those forces to engineer his ouster," and ultimately to entrench the old Soviet security apparatus at the heart of post-Soviet political power.
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Russian law enforcement agencies, security organs, and intelligence services, far from being reliable instruments in the fight against organized crime and corruption, are institutionally part of the problem, due not only to their... more
Russian law enforcement agencies, security organs, and intelligence services, far from being reliable instruments in the fight against organized crime and corruption, are institutionally part of the problem, due not only to their co-optation and penetration by criminal elements, but to their own absence of a legal bureaucratic culture and their use of crime as an instrument of state policy.
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The superstructure of the Soviet Communist Party is gone, but the secret police and intelligence agencies have survived the turmoil and remain firmly ensconced in Russian political, economic and social life. There they threaten reform and... more
The superstructure of the Soviet Communist Party is gone, but the secret police and intelligence agencies have survived the turmoil and remain firmly ensconced in Russian political, economic and social life. There they threaten reform and imperil relations with the West.
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President Boris Yeltsin has given the former KGB virtually free rein in post-Soviet Russia. The chekist cult mentality that permeated the KGB was never erased - the KGB is back.
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The former KGB First Chief Directorate, now known as the SVR, has eclipsed the Russian Foreign Ministry and its minister, Andrei Kozyrev, and is dominating Russian foreign policy-making.
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Democratic reforms are threatened in Russia because President Boris Yeltsin chose to use the former KGB as one of his main bases of political support.
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Western approaches to fighting organized crime in Russia are naive, mirror-imaging on the fight against traditional-style gangsters, and not looking at the most dangerous perpetrators: Russian government officials themselves.
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The Russian government's repeated proposal for Moscow and Washington to devise a mutual reduction in intelligence collection and covert action was floated in the early 1990s after the Soviet collapse. This paper, delivered in Moscow in... more
The Russian government's repeated proposal for Moscow and Washington to devise a mutual reduction in intelligence collection and covert action was floated in the early 1990s after the Soviet collapse. This paper, delivered in Moscow in 1994, argued that the proposal was a bad idea for a democratic Russia and the United States. The author argued that the proposal was based on a false moral equivalency between the chekist services of Russia and the services of Western democracies.
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Scientists from the old Soviet weapons of mass destruction programs are the new persecuted dissidents in 'democratic' Russia of 1993.
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Russia's post-Soviet legal and political development is being stunted by the enactment of laws that preserve the powers of the old secret police apparatus. Legislation passed in 1992 "could be the democrats' undoing" in Russia.
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The disintegration of the USSR and beginning of democratization allow for new forms of cooperation between Moscow and the West. One of the primary tasks is to promote democratic control over the old Soviet instruments of repression - the... more
The disintegration of the USSR and beginning of democratization allow for new forms of cooperation between Moscow and the West. One of the primary tasks is to promote democratic control over the old Soviet instruments of repression - the former KGB - before it subverts and takes control of the emerging Russian government.
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Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) military leader Enrique Bermudez publishes his only essay about the "contras'" strategy to resist and oust the Soviet-backed Sandinista regime. J Michael Waller ghost-wrote the article. [Note:... more
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) military leader Enrique Bermudez publishes his only essay about the "contras'" strategy to resist and oust the Soviet-backed Sandinista regime.
J Michael Waller ghost-wrote the article. [Note: Bermudez was assassinated. Academia.edu's template does not permit the addition of Bermudez's name, so it cannot be inserted in the "author" section.]
J Michael Waller ghost-wrote the article. [Note: Bermudez was assassinated. Academia.edu's template does not permit the addition of Bermudez's name, so it cannot be inserted in the "author" section.]
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Political support networks were an important component of the Soviet Union's assistance programs to Marxist-Leninist insurgencies in the Third World. Moscow employed active measures in support of existing insurgencies, or considered... more
Political support networks were an important component of the Soviet Union's assistance programs to Marxist-Leninist insurgencies in the Third World. Moscow employed active measures in support of existing insurgencies, or considered insurgencies under its control to be active measures that had a natural political support component.
In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, major guerrilla movements aided by the USSR relied as much on propaganda as they did on weapons.
No single audience was as important to influence as the American public, which through the free press and democratic process shaped US foreign and military policy. For this reason, the Soviets worked for decades to recruit agents, set up front groups, and attract loyal "fellow travelers" to conduct propaganda work to influence political debate. Operations in the United States were only a part of a global network of interlocking front organizations controlled by the Soviet government and integrated into the Soviet diplomatic, intelligence, and military infrastructure.
This paper, written as a graduate research project on Soviet active measures in 1987, is a survey of the activities of one of those Soviet-controlled fronts: The Czechoslovakia-based Christian Peace Conference (CPC), and its influence operations with mainline US churches in support of Third World Soviet-backed insurgencies.
Studying the CPC's literature published between 1967 and 1984 formed the core of the research for this paper. Insight into how Soviet fronts functioned was learned through reading articles, monographs, and books by American scholars, as well as p public reports prepared by US intelligence agencies.
The writer gained his most useful primary source knowledge of the operation of Soviet fronts through participation as an "observer" at the World Peace Council conference in Copenhagen, Denmark. There he witnessed how American activists, some wittingly and some unwittingly, organized Soviet-inspired propaganda campaigns for use back home.
Due to the sensitivity of the matter, the author did not disclose at the time that his participation as a World Peace Council "observer" was, in fact, part of a privately funded international effort to infiltrate, divide, and disrupt the World Peace Council and other elements of Soviet active measures campaigns against the United States and NATO.
In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, major guerrilla movements aided by the USSR relied as much on propaganda as they did on weapons.
No single audience was as important to influence as the American public, which through the free press and democratic process shaped US foreign and military policy. For this reason, the Soviets worked for decades to recruit agents, set up front groups, and attract loyal "fellow travelers" to conduct propaganda work to influence political debate. Operations in the United States were only a part of a global network of interlocking front organizations controlled by the Soviet government and integrated into the Soviet diplomatic, intelligence, and military infrastructure.
This paper, written as a graduate research project on Soviet active measures in 1987, is a survey of the activities of one of those Soviet-controlled fronts: The Czechoslovakia-based Christian Peace Conference (CPC), and its influence operations with mainline US churches in support of Third World Soviet-backed insurgencies.
Studying the CPC's literature published between 1967 and 1984 formed the core of the research for this paper. Insight into how Soviet fronts functioned was learned through reading articles, monographs, and books by American scholars, as well as p public reports prepared by US intelligence agencies.
The writer gained his most useful primary source knowledge of the operation of Soviet fronts through participation as an "observer" at the World Peace Council conference in Copenhagen, Denmark. There he witnessed how American activists, some wittingly and some unwittingly, organized Soviet-inspired propaganda campaigns for use back home.
Due to the sensitivity of the matter, the author did not disclose at the time that his participation as a World Peace Council "observer" was, in fact, part of a privately funded international effort to infiltrate, divide, and disrupt the World Peace Council and other elements of Soviet active measures campaigns against the United States and NATO.
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Historical survey of the development of critical theory and cultural Marxism from the early Comintern, through the Frankfurt School and Antonio Gramsci, and the parallel development of the FBI and later the CIA, tracing critical theory's... more
Historical survey of the development of critical theory and cultural Marxism from the early Comintern, through the Frankfurt School and Antonio Gramsci, and the parallel development of the FBI and later the CIA, tracing critical theory's penetration into American academia, diplomacy, and intelligence.
Big Intel examines how critical theory became a mandatory ideological engine of the United States intelligence community, discusses its effects on the CIA and FBI, and offers possible solutions.
Big Intel examines how critical theory became a mandatory ideological engine of the United States intelligence community, discusses its effects on the CIA and FBI, and offers possible solutions.
Research Interests: Critical Theory, Intelligence Studies, COINTELPRO: FBI domestic covert action programs, Herbert Marcuse, Critical Legal Theory, and 10 moreCritical Race Theory, FBI History, History of Comintern, Gramsci, Political Ideology, Frankfurt School, Gramsci and Cultural Hegemony, Central Intelligence Agency, Counterintelligence, and Critical Theory/Frankfurt School
This edited volume examines three aspects of strategic influence, which the authors agree cannot function well without one another: public diplomacy, or soft power; counterpropaganda; and the hard but nonkinetic power of political... more
This edited volume examines three aspects of strategic influence, which the authors agree cannot function well without one another: public diplomacy, or soft power; counterpropaganda; and the hard but nonkinetic power of political warfare.
Chapter authors are Stephen C. Baker, Angelo Codevilla, Andrew Garfield, John Lenczowski, Carnes Lord, Jennifer Marshall, Juliana Geran Pilon, Robert Reilly, Herbert Romerstein, David Spencer, Hampton Stephens, John J. Tierney, and the book's editor, J. Michael Waller.
Chapter authors are Stephen C. Baker, Angelo Codevilla, Andrew Garfield, John Lenczowski, Carnes Lord, Jennifer Marshall, Juliana Geran Pilon, Robert Reilly, Herbert Romerstein, David Spencer, Hampton Stephens, John J. Tierney, and the book's editor, J. Michael Waller.
Research Interests: Propaganda, Public Diplomacy, Strategic Communication, Psychological operations (PSYOP), Information operations (IO), and 8 moreHistory Of Propaganda, Soft Power, Intercultural Communication and Public Diplomacy, Soft Power and International Relations, Psychological warfare, Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, War Propaganda, and Soft Power and Public Diplomacy
This monograph was written as a companion to the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. It contains dimensions of war fighting against Islamist terrorists that the Counterinsurgency manual and its accompanying COIN... more
This monograph was written as a companion to the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. It contains dimensions of war fighting against Islamist terrorists that the Counterinsurgency manual and its accompanying COIN Doctrine did not include. The monograph stresses the strategic uses of psychological warfare, political warfare, ideological warfare, and related non-kinetic weapons.
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This 500-page volume is an edited collection of articles, letters, essays, and official documents about public diplomacy in history and in practice. The Public Diplomacy Reader was edited as a textbook by Dr J Michael Waller for his... more
This 500-page volume is an edited collection of articles, letters, essays, and official documents about public diplomacy in history and in practice. The Public Diplomacy Reader was edited as a textbook by Dr J Michael Waller for his graduate students.
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When a totalitarian group takes power, one of the first institutions it creates is a secret political police. Since the birth of modern totalitarianism, in country after country, secret political police have been the predominant... more
When a totalitarian group takes power, one of the first institutions it creates is a secret political police. Since the birth of modern totalitarianism, in country after country, secret political police have been the predominant instruments of power, used to consolidate power, neutralize the opposition, and erect a one-party state or personalistic regime. Yet, when these same totalitarian regimes have liberalized or collapsed, the secret political police have often managed to survive and remain relevant.
This edited volume contains case studies by Fredo Arias-King, Jaroslav Basta (Czech Republic), Andrezej Grajewski (Poland), John O. Koehler (East Germany), Aado All (Estonia), Tomas Skucas (Lithuania), and J. Michael Waller (Nicaragua and Russia)
This edited volume contains case studies by Fredo Arias-King, Jaroslav Basta (Czech Republic), Andrezej Grajewski (Poland), John O. Koehler (East Germany), Aado All (Estonia), Tomas Skucas (Lithuania), and J. Michael Waller (Nicaragua and Russia)
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The chekist institutions and bureaucratic psychology that comprised the KGB survived the Soviet collapse and continue as the security and intelligence apparatuses of the Russian Federation. This book, an adaptation of a doctoral... more
The chekist institutions and bureaucratic psychology that comprised the KGB survived the Soviet collapse and continue as the security and intelligence apparatuses of the Russian Federation. This book, an adaptation of a doctoral dissertation written between 1989 and 1993, with field research in Moscow during and immediately after the Soviet collapse, is the first scholarly volume on the KGB and the post-Soviet transition. The book predicted the rise of the KGB to dominate Russian politics.
"This is a valuable book." - Foreign Affairs
"This is a valuable book." - Foreign Affairs
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Influencing public opinion abroad is the most effective, adaptable, cost-effective and humane means of leveraging tax dollars to promote national security. We don’t need to use threats or force, intimidation or coercion, or reduce... more
Influencing public opinion abroad is the most effective, adaptable, cost-effective and humane means of leveraging tax dollars to promote national security. We don’t need to use threats or force, intimidation or coercion, or reduce ourselves to self-defeating bluster when our other tools fail, Dr Waller states in 2010 testimony before a congressional panel.
We have soft power, the policies of attraction that Professor Nye has so elegantly crystallized: long-term, positive, appealing aspects of American culture and society that aren’t necessarily calibrated to promote a particular policy or initiative, but are always working for us in the background. Then we have the evolution of that idea to “smart power,” as Professor Nye and his colleagues have done.
I would take that approach a bit further still, adding a hard edge to soft power when attraction fails, but giving our nation extra tools to use instead of military force. This edge takes two forms. The first is political action – the same type of political action that other countries use against us when they hire lobbyists, fund grass-roots front organizations, and channel money through political action committees and similar organizations. If other countries can use the American system to apply pressure on Members of Congress and the executive branch – and even further their agendas by helping elect or defeat candidates and incumbents – then is the United States not compelled to do the same around the world to promote its own interests? So we need a political action instrument of US national security policy to influence public opinion and decisionmaking in other countries.
We have soft power, the policies of attraction that Professor Nye has so elegantly crystallized: long-term, positive, appealing aspects of American culture and society that aren’t necessarily calibrated to promote a particular policy or initiative, but are always working for us in the background. Then we have the evolution of that idea to “smart power,” as Professor Nye and his colleagues have done.
I would take that approach a bit further still, adding a hard edge to soft power when attraction fails, but giving our nation extra tools to use instead of military force. This edge takes two forms. The first is political action – the same type of political action that other countries use against us when they hire lobbyists, fund grass-roots front organizations, and channel money through political action committees and similar organizations. If other countries can use the American system to apply pressure on Members of Congress and the executive branch – and even further their agendas by helping elect or defeat candidates and incumbents – then is the United States not compelled to do the same around the world to promote its own interests? So we need a political action instrument of US national security policy to influence public opinion and decisionmaking in other countries.
Research Interests:
US assistance programs in the Western Hemisphere require a strong public diplomacy element as a means of ensuring that aid is provided consistent with the national interest. In this testimony to a congressional subcommittee, Dr Waller... more
US assistance programs in the Western Hemisphere require a strong public diplomacy element as a means of ensuring that aid is provided consistent with the national interest. In this testimony to a congressional subcommittee, Dr Waller questions the wisdom of a "Social Investment Fund." He argues for caution "when political leaders, cause-driven non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and bureaucrats speak of using such 'investments' to promote 'social development' abroad."
Commentary on Social Investment Funds:
"Such jargon reminds one of the great failed social engineering experiments of the past. Will a new 'Social Investment Fund for the Americas' really reap a return on its investment that would satisfy most taxpayers? Or will it become a new means of financing domestic and foreign political and social movements that many in Congress and in the public would find objectionable—thus undermining the already soft public support for foreign development aid?
"Will a 'Social Investment Fund for the Americas'' promote the self-sufficiency and productivity that so many people in the hemisphere desperately need? Or will it make those people even more dependent on constant handouts from inefficient bureaucracies and corrupt political machines? Is it designed to force those inefficient bureaucracies and corrupt political machines to open up, reform themselves, and break the cycle of political dependency at home? If so, what political and diplomatic tools are included in the package? If not, will it bolster those same bureaucracies and political machines and even make them become wards of USAID?"
Will a 'Social Investment Fund for the Americas' become another program that subsumes the U.S. national interest to the political or social agendas of well-meaning aid workers and special-interest groups? Will it become another foreign extension of domestic political and social battles? Will it promote practices that are morally or socially offensive to significant portions of the population in the recipient countries—to say nothing of the taxpayers at home?
Commentary on Social Investment Funds:
"Such jargon reminds one of the great failed social engineering experiments of the past. Will a new 'Social Investment Fund for the Americas' really reap a return on its investment that would satisfy most taxpayers? Or will it become a new means of financing domestic and foreign political and social movements that many in Congress and in the public would find objectionable—thus undermining the already soft public support for foreign development aid?
"Will a 'Social Investment Fund for the Americas'' promote the self-sufficiency and productivity that so many people in the hemisphere desperately need? Or will it make those people even more dependent on constant handouts from inefficient bureaucracies and corrupt political machines? Is it designed to force those inefficient bureaucracies and corrupt political machines to open up, reform themselves, and break the cycle of political dependency at home? If so, what political and diplomatic tools are included in the package? If not, will it bolster those same bureaucracies and political machines and even make them become wards of USAID?"
Will a 'Social Investment Fund for the Americas' become another program that subsumes the U.S. national interest to the political or social agendas of well-meaning aid workers and special-interest groups? Will it become another foreign extension of domestic political and social battles? Will it promote practices that are morally or socially offensive to significant portions of the population in the recipient countries—to say nothing of the taxpayers at home?
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This paper is expert testimony before a US Senate subcommittee on the subject of terrorist penetration of the US military and prison systems. Presenting the testimony as the product of a research team, Dr Waller found that: (1) Foreign... more
This paper is expert testimony before a US Senate subcommittee on the subject of terrorist penetration of the US military and prison systems. Presenting the testimony as the product of a research team, Dr Waller found that:
(1) Foreign states and movements have been financing the promotion of radical, political Islam, which we call Islamism, within America's armed forces and prisons.
(2) That alien ideology, with heavy political overtones, preaches intolerance and hatred of American society, culture, government, and the principles enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.
(3) Adherents to that ideology directly and indirectly spawn, train, finance, supply and mobilize terrorists who would destroy our system of government and our way of life.
(4) They have created civil support networks for terrorists at home and abroad, providing material assistance, fundraising operations, logistics, propaganda, legal assistance in the event of arrest or imprisonment, and bringing political pressure to bear on policymakers grappling with counterterrorism issues.
(5) The Islamists exploited the nation's prison chaplancies and the created the Muslim chaplain cadre in the armed forces as one of several avenues of infiltration, recruitment, training and operation.
The FBI witness at the same hearing, John Postale, disputed Dr Waller's findings, but the findings were proven correct.
(1) Foreign states and movements have been financing the promotion of radical, political Islam, which we call Islamism, within America's armed forces and prisons.
(2) That alien ideology, with heavy political overtones, preaches intolerance and hatred of American society, culture, government, and the principles enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.
(3) Adherents to that ideology directly and indirectly spawn, train, finance, supply and mobilize terrorists who would destroy our system of government and our way of life.
(4) They have created civil support networks for terrorists at home and abroad, providing material assistance, fundraising operations, logistics, propaganda, legal assistance in the event of arrest or imprisonment, and bringing political pressure to bear on policymakers grappling with counterterrorism issues.
(5) The Islamists exploited the nation's prison chaplancies and the created the Muslim chaplain cadre in the armed forces as one of several avenues of infiltration, recruitment, training and operation.
The FBI witness at the same hearing, John Postale, disputed Dr Waller's findings, but the findings were proven correct.
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United States policy toward Russia has been tailor-made for exploitation by the gangster-bureaucrats, oligarchs, military revanchists and secret police officials ruling Russia today. Administration suppression of warnings and analysis... more
United States policy toward Russia has been tailor-made for exploitation by the gangster-bureaucrats, oligarchs, military revanchists and secret police officials ruling Russia today. Administration suppression of warnings and analysis about deteriorating conditions in Russia shows a calculated policy to prevent decision-makers, Congress, and the public from learning the truth and taking early corrective action, Dr Waller tells Congress in a 1999 hearing.
That policy has rewarded and protected corruption in Russia, discouraged honest crime-fighters in Russia, breathed new life into anti-Western retrograde forces, undermined progressive and pro-Western forces in Russia, and dismissed and even retaliated against constructive critics at home.
Misguided U.S. policy toward Russia has rested on six fundamental points:
1. Unconditionally support the incumbent corrupt Kremlin regime and excuse away all its excesses;
2. Keep billions of dollars in cash flowing into the corrupt central bank with no accounting of how the money is spent;
3. Leverage none of the United States’ immense resources to reduce corruption, promote openness and fairness, or to make sure the aid gets to where it is needed in Russia;
4. Place the bulk of bilateral aid resources into the pockets of U.S. companies, not into projects within Russia that brought rapid tangible benefits and hopes to the Russian people;
5. Ignore or suppress opinions and facts indicating that the policy might be failing;
6. Insist that the policy is working.
That policy has rewarded and protected corruption in Russia, discouraged honest crime-fighters in Russia, breathed new life into anti-Western retrograde forces, undermined progressive and pro-Western forces in Russia, and dismissed and even retaliated against constructive critics at home.
Misguided U.S. policy toward Russia has rested on six fundamental points:
1. Unconditionally support the incumbent corrupt Kremlin regime and excuse away all its excesses;
2. Keep billions of dollars in cash flowing into the corrupt central bank with no accounting of how the money is spent;
3. Leverage none of the United States’ immense resources to reduce corruption, promote openness and fairness, or to make sure the aid gets to where it is needed in Russia;
4. Place the bulk of bilateral aid resources into the pockets of U.S. companies, not into projects within Russia that brought rapid tangible benefits and hopes to the Russian people;
5. Ignore or suppress opinions and facts indicating that the policy might be failing;
6. Insist that the policy is working.
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Presidential and administration rhetoric over a nuclear missile de-targeting agreement with Russia is misleading because the narrative creates the false impression that the nuclear threat is over. Dr Waller details an explanation of this... more
Presidential and administration rhetoric over a nuclear missile de-targeting agreement with Russia is misleading because the narrative creates the false impression that the nuclear threat is over. Dr Waller details an explanation of this false narrative in his 1997 testimony to a congressional panel.
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Russian law enforcement agencies, security organs, and intelligence services, far from being reliable instruments in the fight against organized crime and corruption, are institutionally part of the problem, due not only to their... more
Russian law enforcement agencies, security organs, and intelligence services, far from being reliable instruments in the fight against organized crime and corruption, are institutionally part of the problem, due not only to their co-optation and penetration by criminal elements, but to their own absence of a legal bureaucratic culture and their use of crime as an instrument of state policy.
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Page 1. Tyranny TRANSITIONING BEYOND TOTALITARIAN X REGIMES ILAN HERMAN AND J. MICHAEL WALLER Page 2. Page 3. DISMANTLING TYRANNY Page 4. Page 5. DISMANTLING TYRANNY Transitioning Beyond ...
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THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITICS PRESS Published in the United States of America by The Institute of World Politics Press 1521 16th Street NW, Washington DC 20036 USA www.iwp.edu The Institute of World Politics Press and IWP Press are... more
THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITICS PRESS Published in the United States of America by The Institute of World Politics Press 1521 16th Street NW, Washington DC 20036 USA www.iwp.edu The Institute of World Politics Press and IWP Press are the academic ...
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... of reformist MVD chief Bakatin and the subsequent decrees which led to the crackdowns in the Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia and elsewhere. ... Cracks within the security apparatus will likely expand and deepen in the course of the... more
... of reformist MVD chief Bakatin and the subsequent decrees which led to the crackdowns in the Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia and elsewhere. ... Cracks within the security apparatus will likely expand and deepen in the course of the expected post-coup purges of its personnel. ...
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